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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we present an approach to model and quantify (inter)dependencies between
the Electrical Infrastructure (EI) and the Information Infrastructure (II) that implements the
EI control and monitoring system. The quantification is achieved through the integration of
two models: one that concentrates more on the structure of the power grid and its physical
quantities and one that concentrates on the behavior of the control system supported by
the II. Themodeling approach is exemplified on a scenario whose goal is to study the effects
of an II partial failure (a denial of service attack that compromises the communication
network) on the remote control of the EI. The approach has been initially developed as part
of the European project CRUTIAL.
c⃝ 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.d1. Introduction
Electrical Power Systems (EPS) supply a vital oxygen to
people lives. Ongoing infrastructural and organizational
transformations in the energy sector have to guarantee the
continuous availability of power provisions. There is evidence
that EPS blackouts are often caused by a concurrency
of events, that include classical physical faults in the
electrical components, but also wrong or untimely behavior
from the control systems and/or their human operators,
often caused or exacerbated by a malfunctioning of the
telecommunication system that supports the EPS control.
EPS players are paying increasing attention to the possibility
that such malfunctioning is actually caused by malicious
threats to control systems, and special attention is devoted
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1874-5482/$ - see front matter c⃝ 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserve
doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2012.01.003to understand the dependencies between the electrical
grid, the control systems that manage the grid and the
telecommunication networks that support the control.
In this paper we focus on the dependencies between the
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) system
(in particular the telecommunication component) and the
electrical grid being controlled, in particular we investigate
the consequences of a malfunctioning of the communication
system when the grid has just experienced a failure, like
the loss of a generator or the tripping of a line. This is a
scenario in which a timely (remote) control action is vital to
avoid a failure propagation that may potentially lead to large
black-outs.
Considering the crucial role of control systems in govern-
ing the quality and the stability of the electric power service,
.
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ing the infrastructures to have tools for analyzing threat im-
pacts and technologies for avoiding, or limiting, most serious
consequences. In this paper the considered scenario is stud-
ied through modeling, due to its high flexibility in exploring
a wide range of alternatives at a limited cost. In particular a
stochastic modeling approach has been pursued allowing us
to represent randomness of physical faults and to model at a
sufficiently high abstraction level the effect of malicious at-
tacks as they propagate under variable network conditions.
These studies have been pursued in the framework of the
EU project CRUTIAL [1], that has developed an architectural
framework to improve the resiliency of power control
systems in the presence of threats to their information and
communication infrastructures. The project focused on the
electrical and the information infrastructures (EI and II), by
considering different topologies and different kinds of risk,
identified through a set of scenarios that illustrate interesting
patterns of interaction between the EI and the II.
In order to master the complex mechanisms of global fail-
ures, particular focus was put on the study and modeling of
the types of failures that are characteristic of interdependent
critical infrastructures. Although the modeling of such fail-
ures has received increasing interest in the last years after
the large blackouts of electric power transmission systems in
1996 and 2003, there is still no definite understanding on EPS
interdependencies, and on the techniques to evaluate the im-
pact of cascading, escalating and common cause failures.
The modeling framework developed in CRUTIAL includes
both qualitative and quantitative models. Qualitative models
are aimed at capturing the interaction between EI and II [2]
and have led to the definition of a new class of automata [3].
Qualitative modeling will not be discussed in this paper, that
concentrates instead on quantitative modeling.
This paper summarizes the two different quantitative
approaches that have been pursued and proposes a way to
integrate the two to get a more faithful description of the EI,
the II and the impact that a malicious attack on the latter has
on the former, in particular when facing a critical scenario.
The first approach, described in Section 4, is based on
Stochastic Well-formed Nets (SWN) [4,5] and is more centered
around the protocols addressed by the scenario and a Denial
of Service (DoS) attack, while the EI behavior is described in
very abstract terms. A preliminary version of this model was
described in [6].
The second approach, described in Section 5, is based on
an integration of a Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) [7,8]
model of the EPS with techniques imported from the power
engineering field to model and simulate the electrical state
of the EPS. A preliminary version of this model has been
described in [9,10]. This approach (that we shall call SAN for
short) allows a rather detailed model of the EPS; however the
model of the control algorithms and of the counter measures
that take place upon a failure are treated at a rather abstract
level.
In these two sections the SWN and SAN models are
revisited so as to pave the way for the integration of the
two, described in Section 6: it is by integrating the two
models that we reach an adequate level of detail in both
the EI and II behavior and shed some light on the interplaybetween the two infrastructures. The quantitative analysis
of the integrated model allows us to stochastically quantify
the effects of the dependencies between EI and II when
a cyber threat is in action: the integration is cast in the
context of a failure scenario in which a DoS attack disrupts
the communication abilities of the EPS control centers. The
scenario is described in Section 3.
Section 7 reports an extensive analysis of an example grid,
under the target scenario, to enlighten the different types of
analysis that can be performed using the integrated model.
Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 8.
This paper is an extended version of the preliminary
work presented at the CRIS conference [11]. In this extended
version the various forms of model interactions have been
clarified and extensive experimental results have been added.
2. Previous literature
Understanding the reciprocal effects of interdependencies
among interacting critical infrastructures (CI), as well as
quantifying resiliency, security and robustness related in-
dicators are tackled by a number of research initiatives/
organizations. An overview is provided in [12]. A rigorous ap-
proach to analyze and understand how infrastructure sectors
(including water, power, energy, telecommunications, and the
Internet) evolve, where they are vulnerable, and how they can
best be protected is presented in [13].
The European project IRRIIS [14] devoted significant effort
to interdependency analysis andmodeling, with special focus
on scenarios describing the future situation with respect to
telecommunication and electricity infrastructures in 2015. A
theoretical framework has been developed in [15], where an
approach equivalent to process modeling is adopted, which
views a CI as a process and dependencies are modeled as
response functions. Quantitative interdependency analysis,
in the context of Large Complex CI, is presented in [16],
where a discrete state–space, continuous-time stochastic
process models the operation of critical infrastructures,
taking interdependencies into account. Of primary interest
are the implications of both the level of model abstraction
and model parametrization for the study of dependencies
on the distribution of cascade-sizes within and across
infrastructures. Also, the Leontief input–output economical
model dedicated to the market dynamics representation has
been exploited and adapted to model critical infrastructures
dependencies. Recently, in the context of the EU MIA
(Methodology for Interdependencies Assessment) project, a
Markov Chain law replaces the Leontief equilibrium condition
upon external changes, thus allowing us to follow the
transition from one equilibrium configuration to another
and possibly mimic cascade effects triggered by unwilled
disturbances [17]. Among the empirical studies, in [18] an
empirical approach is applied to analyze a large set of
CI failure data, to discover patterns across infrastructure
failures. The IRRIIS consortium has also developed SimCIP
(Simulation for CI Protection), an agent-based simulation
environment for controlled experimentation, intended to be
used to deepen the understanding of critical infrastructures
and their interdependencies [19]. The power blackout
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on the dependencies of the telecommunication infrastructure
from the power supply. Our framework is based on stochastic
models, similar to [16], but it is specifically tailored to EPS
and allows us to deal with a more detailed representation
of the major components and dynamics of the electric
grid and related ICT control. In terms of evaluations of
power versus ICT interdependencies, the IRRIIS scenarios are
complementary to those illustrated here.
Several other models based on simulation have been pro-
posed to accomplish interdependencies analysis, especially
with reference to EPS alone [20,21] and in connection with
telecommunication networks [22–25]. These studies mainly
focus on reproducing network disruptions, which eventually
lead to blackouts, in order to estimate the vulnerabilities of
the system or the impact on the EPS reliability of important
network parameters. However, most of the existing models
do not provide explicit modeling of the main interdependent
subsystems and of the interdependencies between such sub-
systems, so evaluation of the impact on dependability and
performability of cascading or escalating failures is not triv-
ial. Only in [21], interactions between EI disturbances and the
often imperfect human operator control actions have been
considered.
The National Science Foundation project TCIP, currently
extended in TCIP-G with support also from the Department
of Energy and contributions from the Department of
Homeland Security, focuses on securing low-level devices,
communication and data systems that make up the
power grid, to ensure trustworthy operation during normal
conditions, cyber attacks and/or power emergencies. As
reported in [26], quantitative and qualitative evaluation
constitutes amajor research effort in TCIP with investigations
on means to model, simulate, emulate and experiment
with the various subsystems in the power grid. A variety
of evaluation tools are adopted to enable validation,
including PowerWorld, RINSE, formal logic, PowerWeb and
APT. Although interdependencies are among the aspects of
interest in these studies, the major effort is devoted to
cyber security, smart grid vulnerabilities and communication
technologies.
Several other works have been directed to analyze
structural vulnerabilities and the risk of cyber attacks. In [27],
the authors conducted a structural analysis of the power
transmission grid by applying a topological approach that
extends the traditional topological metrics derived from
complex network theory (e.g., degrees of nodes and global
efficiency) with two new metrics, entropic degree and net-
ability, accounting for the physical/operational behavior of
power grids in terms of real power-flow allocation over
lines and line flow limits. This approach can be used to
assess structural vulnerabilities in power systems in contrast
with traditional, purely topological metrics. The impact
analysis of control systems availability on managing power
contingencies is not supported by this extended topological
approach. In the research activity by Liu et al. [28] the
risk of cyber attacks on the power system is calculated as
the product of two factors: the probability of a successful
intrusion and the impact of the intrusion as unserved load.
The two risk factors are evaluated by two separate techniques.The cyber layer underlying substation control systems is
analyzed through stochastic firewall and password models,
while the impact factor for the attack upon a Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is measured
by the ratio loss of load/total load through power flow
simulation. Experiments are conducted on a case study via
simulation of the power flow and dynamic analysis. The
possibility of integration of the cyber and power models
is based on the simplifying assumption that cyber attacks
provoke the unexpected opening of circuit breakers and,
consequently, the correspondent loss of load. However, in
these studies interdependencies aspects are not dealt with
specifically.
More recently, the issue of how to measure the level of
interdependencies and to identify appropriate metrics for
quantifying their strength is being addressed in a few studies,
such as [29–31]. These studies are orthogonal to our objective
and could be profitably employed to guide the analysis of
EPS by concentrating on those interdependencies showing an
higher degree of strength.
3. The reference scenario and analysis objec-
tives
The model interaction presented in this paper is applied
to the telecontrol scenario developed in CRUTIAL [32], and
shows the interaction between II and EI in presence of DoS
and electrical failures. It involves both Transmission and
Distribution System Operators (TSO and DSO respectively),
but it only considers the DoS attack affecting the DSO net.
The effect of DoS occurrence is studied under emergency
conditions (e.g. line failure, loss of generation, switching
errors, etc.), when recovery actions have to be performed
under strict real time constraints to avoid more severe
damages to the EI.
Let us explain such a scenario inmore detail and introduce
the main TSO and DSO operators involved. In emergency
conditions the TSO is authorized by the DSO to activate load
shedding activities on the distribution grid; therefore the TSO
Control Center (CC) monitors the Electric Power System and
detects some potentially dangerous conditions that could be
recovered with appropriate load shedding commands applied
to particular areas of the grid. In order to actuate this
defense/recover action the TSO CC chooses a subset of DSO
Substations (SSs) from the list of DSO SSs participating in the
emergency plan, then it sends the requests of preventively
arming the control units of these DSO SSs to their DSO
Control Centers (CCs). These requests are delivered from the
TSO CC to the DSO CC through a shared communication
channel. Then the DSO CC forwards the arm command to the
required DSO SSs, and returns their status to the TSO CC.
At the same time, a special TSO node called the TSO
sentinel (usually a TSO node located in a strategic point of
the grid) independently monitors the EI status to quickly
detect if the potential emergency condition is evolving into
a real emergency situation. When a real emergency situation
is detected the TSO sentinel sends the load shedding action to
all the DSO SSs participating to the emergency plan; however
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detached.
In the period between the detection of a potential emer-
gency and its evolution towards a new status, the TSO sen-
tinel periodically sends test packets towards the detachable
DSO SSs. If an armed DSO SS does not receive the expected
test packet within 1 min, it automatically disarms itself.
Disarming also occurs after 20 min from the arming com-
mand if no load shedding command is issued by the sentinel.
In this context different behaviors can be envisaged
depending on when the DoS occurs. For instance, a DoS attack
starting before issuing the arming command towards a given
DSO SS creates the possibility of preventing the execution of
that DSO SS trip command. Instead, if a DoS attack takes
place when the substation is armed, the attack may deny
the successful execution of the periodic testing and causes
the consequent automatic disarming of all/some DSO SSs.
Finally, the DoS may occur just before sending the load
shedding command thus denying the possibility of defending
the system from extreme contingencies.
Therefore the effects of the considered DoS on the EPS will
depend on the number and position of DSO SSs affected by
the attack and on the pattern and intensity of the DoS.
The identification of the dependencies of EI and II
upon an electrical failure in presence of a DoS, and their
quantification, is the aim of the work presented in this paper.
4. The SWN model
The ICT control system implemented by the II infrastructure
is modeled using SWN [5]: an high level Stochastic Petri Net
formalism, where tokens may have identities (colors), and
transitions may fire either immediately or after a random
delay characterized by a negative exponential distribution.
Hereafter we assume that the reader is familiar with SWNs, a
complete description of this formalism can be found in [5].
The SWNmodel is shown in Fig. 1(A), where its submodels,
highlighted by dotted boxes, correspond to the components
described in the previous section (i.e. TSO CC, DSO CC,
communication channel, DSO SS, TSO sentinel, EI and
Attacker submodels). It is a refinement of the one presented
in [6].
It details the flow of events of the load shedding process
among the TSO CC, the DSO CC, the DSO SSs, and the TSO
sentinel, while the status of the EI and the attack is modeled
as an external environment (Attacker and EI submodels). We
do not explicitly model the causes of a failure in EI, of an
arming by the TSO CC or of an attack to the communication,
but we consider each of them as regulated by a stochastic
law expressed by transitions e-failure and e-failure1 in the
EI submodel, StartArmingProcess and EndArmingProcess in the
TSO CC submodel, and Begin_attack, End_attack in the Attacker
one.
The TSO CC submodel interacts with the rest of the model
through transition TransmitArming, that sends the arming
commands to the DSO CC.
The EI submodel interacts instead through its state:
when it is in Partial outage the TSO sentinel issues a
load shedding command (transition LoadShedding), while asuccessful completion of the load shedding causes an e-
restoration which takes the EI back to the state e-working. If
the transition e-restoration does not fire before the occurrence
of a second e-failure then the EI state becomes e-lost and the
transition #Reset fires. Note that transition #Reset is equipped
with a special semantics: when it fires it brings the model
back to the initial marking.
In the model we assume a discrete number of DoS severity
levels (L1 to L4) modeled by the colored class C2. When
place Active is marked, transition IncreaseSeverity increases
the severity level (AttackSeverity place). Instead when the
attack is over, the place Idle is marked and transition e-
restoration takes the severity level back to L1. The attacker
submodel influences the transmissions from DSO CC to
DSO SS (DSOtoSS-COM submodel) and back (SStoDSO-COM):
transitions rates are defined so that a higher severity of
the attack makes more probable to lose or delay packets
(LostPacket and TxDelay transition weights depend on the
marking of the AttackSeverity place).
In the addressed scenario TSO arms a subset of DSO
SSs, and the precise subset depends on the arming policy.
Substations are identified by colors of the class C1, and z com-
mands are generated for z different DSO SSs colors (transi-
tions CC_selection, CC_endselection and associated places). The
DSO CC submodel also includes the reception of an acknowl-
edge from the substations (places DSO_CC_buffer_in, Com-
mands and associated transitions), which allows the DSO to
detect an anomaly if an acknowledge is not received for too
long (place Packet_loss and associated transitions). When an
arming command is received by the DSO SS, the substation
executes the arming (transition Exec), sets its state to armed
(token in place SS_armed), and sends back an acknowledge
that, as the arming command itself, can be lost or delayed de-
pending on the presence and severity of an attack. According
to the scenario a substation stays armed for at most 20 min,
after which a disarming occurs (transition ArmedExpired).
Observe that this model does not consider the DSO SS dis-
arming when no test packets are received.
The last submodel is for the TSO sentinel, that issues a
load shedding command to all DSO SSs (place LSpending).
Since only armed substations can execute a load shedding,
and since not all arming commands may have been received
in time or received at all, the e-restoration may end
successfully (transition e-restoration enabled when at least k
DSO SSs were armed) or not (transition Fail_e-restoration).
The model is parametric in the number of substations
(cardinality of the color class C1), in the number of levels
of DoS (cardinality of the color class C2), in the number
z of DSO SSs chosen by the arming policy, and in the
minimum number k of substations that need to successfully
complete a load shedding for the e-restoration to take place.
It is also parametric on all stochastic elements (delays and
probabilities of choices). Additional flexibility is allowed also
by the modular construction, which allows us to plug-in
other models of DoS or other types of attacks, as long as
they interact by influencing the transmission of packets (loss
probability and transmission delay).
The scope and the assumptions behind this model and
its placement with respect to our analysis objectives will be
discussed in Section 6, where its integration with the SAN
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possibility to further simplify this model (leading to the SWN
in Fig. 1(B)) in the context of its integration with the SAN.
5. The SAN model
To allow a realistic estimation of the impact of the DoS
on the EI, we have decided to make use of the SAN
modeling approach of CRUTIAL, reported in [9,10,33], and here
summarized in its general aspects and in those aspects that
will be the base for the integration. The SAN approach has
been developed in the context of the transmission grid and
uses a terminology that is slightly different from the one used
for the scenario and SWN description. However, it adapts to
the distribution grid as well, since the electrical elements are
the same and the II operations are abstracted in a way that
can be easily extended for including the defense procedure
of the reference scenario that requires communications
among the distribution grid control components. To allow
the reader to refer to both the original paper [9] and the
scenario definition, we shall provide a mapping of the major
terminology items.
Logical scheme of EPS. In the bottom part of Fig. 2, which de-
picts the logical structure of a homogeneous region of the
transmission grid, we can see the main elements that con-
stitute the electric infrastructure: generators (NG components),
substations (NS components), loads (NL components) and power
lines (AL components, which also logically include breakers
and protections connected to the power lines).
In the upper part of Fig. 2 we have depicted a possible
logical structure of a regional II, i.e., the part of the
information system controlling and operating on a region ofFig. 2 – Logical structure of the analyzed EPS instance.
the transmission grid. The components LCS (Local Control
System) and RTS (Regional Telecontrol System) differ for
their criticality and for the locality of their decisions, and
they can exchange grid status information and control data
over a (public or private) network (ComNet component).
LCS guarantees the correct operation of a node equipment
and reconfigures the node in case of breakdown of some
apparatus. RTS monitors its assigned region in order to
diagnose faults on the power lines. In case of breakdowns,
it chooses the most suitable corrective actions to restore the
functionality of the grid. RTS corresponds to the TSO CC of
the scenario, and LCS corresponds to the control units local
to the TSO Sentinel (NS components) and the DSO SS (NL
components) MCD-TU. Since in this scenario we assume a
MCD-TU for each substation then LCS corresponds also to a
DSO SS. Note that the concept of DSO control center is not
explicitly modeled, but it is taken into account by the control
function explained in the sequel (RS1 and RS2).
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but they are abstracted at two levels, on the basis of the
locality of the EI state considered by II to decide on proper
reactions to disruptions. Each level is characterized by an
activation condition (that specifies the events that enable
the II reaction), a reaction delay (representing the overall
computation and application time needed by II to apply a
reconfiguration) and a reconfiguration strategy (RS), based
on generation re-dispatch and/or load shedding. For each
level, a different reconfiguration function is considered: RS1(),
to represent the effect on the regional transmission grid of
the reactions of II to an event that has compromised the
electrical equilibrium1 of EI, when only the state local to
the affected EI components is considered. RS1() is performed
by LCS components and, because of the limited information
necessary to issue its output, it is fast in providing its reaction.
RS2() is performed by RTS, and represents the effect on the
regional transmission grid of the reactions of II to an event
that has compromised the electrical equilibrium of EI, when
the state of the whole EI system under the control of II is
considered. Therefore, RS2() is determined on the global EI
state and reacts in a longer time.
In the current implementation, the output of RS1() is ob-
tained by the solution of power flow equations while mini-
mizing a simple cost function, indicating the cost incurred
in having loads not satisfied and having the generators pro-
ducing more power. The output values of RS2() are derived by
solving an optimization problem to minimize the change in
generation or load shedding, under additional system con-
straints, as described in [34]. The reconfiguration strategy
RS1() is applied immediately, while RS2() is applied after a
time needed by RTS to evaluate it. All these functions are
based on the state of EI at the time immediately after the
occurrence of the failure.
SAN model of EPS. The logical EPS scheme just presented
has been modeled through the SAN formalism [8] a gener-
alization of Stochastic Petri Nets featuring state variables of
any type (including doubles) and C-like functions to express
transition enabling and state change. The models have been
simulated through Möbius [7], a powerful multi-formalism/
multi-solution tool.
Several atomic models have been identified as building
blocks to generate the overall EPSmodel, which are composed
and replicated to obtain the full model of the EPS region.
The atomic models interact with each other by exploiting
the feature of shared places of the SAN formalism. In the
developed EPS model, shared places represent part of the
states of the EPS, like the initial and the current power flow
through each line of the grid, the status of the propagation
of a failure or a lightning, the disrupted/failed components,
the open lines, etc. Through these interactions, it is also
possible to represent the interdependencies between II and
EI subsystems and the subsequent cascading or escalation
failures caused by malfunctions (either at cyber or electrical
levels).
1 Events that impact on the electrical equilibrium are typically
an EI component’s failure or the insertion of a new/repaired EI
component; for simplicity, in the following we will refer only to
failures.The developed SAN model supports the evaluation,
through simulation, of performability measures [35], account-
ing for both dependability and performance of the analyzed
infrastructures. Measures are defined through a reward struc-
ture that associates proper costs/benefits to generators/loads
and interruption of service supply. In this paper, we con-
centrate on the expected percentage of undelivered power
demand.
We shall discuss the scope and the underlying assumption
of this model with respect to our analysis objectives more
extensively in the next section.
6. Model interaction
While the SAN and the SWN models in isolation can be con-
sidered as models of the behavior of an EPS whose commu-
nication infrastructure has been attacked by a DoS, it is quite
clear that there are a number of simplifying hypotheses be-
hind it and that each of them represents more faithfully a
specific point of view abstracting out other details. The SWN
model assumes that the load shedding command is issued
whenever the EI is in a Partial e-outage state, but this is not
always the case in reality, it depends on the complete state
of the EI. Similarly, the model assumes that the e-restoration
can take place or not depending on the number of detached
substations, and that any restoration is successful: again this
depends on the state of the power grid, that is not included in
the model. Nevertheless the modeling of the arming requests
and successive load shedding command by the sentinel, in
presence of a DoS, represents quite faithfully the scenario’s
behavior.
For what concerns the SAN model there are also a number
of discrepancies with respect to the considered scenario.
The control is a two-level hierarchy, while it is three levels
(TSO-CC, DSO-CC and SS) in the scenario. Nevertheless some
of this information is taken into account implicitly by the
reconfiguration functions RS1() and RS2(), for example the
reconfiguration can be computed on a limited portion of
the grid, thus “emulating” the subset of SS involved in an
emergency plan as determined by the TSO-CC. The SAN
model that has been presented in Section 5 can account for
the loss of an electrical component, which is what triggers
the computation of a new configuration of the electrical state
of the grid. The SAN model can also account for a failure in
the II, such as the DoS attack considered in the scenario, by
modeling them in terms of the number of LCS components
available for a reconfiguration. In the SANmodel this number
is computed based on a probability (constant in time) of an
LCS being reachable or not. This is actually a weak point of
this approach, since using a fixed probability does not model
correctly an important characteristics of the DoS which is its
inherently dynamic nature, so that its impact (in particular
on the number of reachable LCS) changes over time, and this
should be taken into account in the model.
To exploit the specific feature of each model, we have
defined a method to integrate the results obtained by each
of them.
Fig. 3 depicts the behavior of the EI and II upon EI-failures
(left) and the behavior of the DoS attack in terms of its severity
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the DoS attack behavior.
levels (right): when an event occurs in the time-line, the result
will depend on the severity level reached by the DoS attack at
that point in time.
The first time-line of Fig. 3 depicts a case in which an
EI-failure causes the start of the computation of RS2() at time
0. At time1T the computation terminates, the new configura-
tion computed through RS2() is applied. If the reconfiguration
was adequate a stable state is reached, if not, some electri-
cal components will disconnect due to the local protections
and a new RS2() is computed, leading potentially to a load
shedding request. Observe that the reconfiguration success
depends also on the DoS attack severity.
The second time-line shows a case, in which between time
0 and 1T a second EI failure takes place. In this case the RS2()
function is aborted, all the armed LCSs are disarmed, and a
new RS2() function is started.
The third time-line shows a case where a low severity
EI-failure happens followed by a high severity one: the former
EI-failure moves the system in alert state and triggers the
arming process at time 0, while the latter one moves the
system in the alarm state and triggers the load shedding
process at time t′.
The interaction between SWN and SAN takes place
precisely on the computation of the number of reachable and armed
LCSs at time t given the arming process started at time 0, and
given an initial DoS severity level. This number is a random
variable whose value at time t is distributed according to
prob(NumStation, t|InitDosLevel). This distribution is computed
in isolation on the SWN as the number of armed substations
at a finite time horizon t and for an initial DoS severity level.
If we consider a behavior like that depicted in the first two
time-lines of Fig. 3, and we consider that the DoS level at
time 0 is L, then the SWN should compute the distributions
at time 1T given the initial DoS severity level L (prob(∗,1T|L)).
Instead, if we consider the policy depicted in the last time-
line, we should compute the distributions at times t + 1T
given the initial DoS severity level L (prob(∗, t + 1T|L)). This
is due to the fact that the arming process is triggered by the
first EI-failure, while the load shedding process caused by the
second EI-failure happens at time t. This approach requires a
discretization of time with an appropriate time step, and the
computation at each step the distribution of the number of
reachable LCSs at time t (with t upper bounded by 1T).
To compute the required distributions the SWN model
can be significantly simplified (as depicted in Fig. 1(B)),since all the aspects concerning the Electrical behavior
(issue of arming and load shedding commands, electrical
failure, etc.) are already taken into account by the SAN
model. The simplified SWN model can be considered as
equivalent to the SWN model of Fig. 1(A) conditioned on the
fact that an arming has been issued and that an attack
has started. The simplified model includes the buffer where
the arming commands are waiting to be transmitted from
the DSO CC to the substations (place DSO_CC_buffer_out),
along the way they can be lost (transition LostPacket) or
delayed (transition sequence ForwardedPacket,TxDelay) due to
the DoS attack effect; when a message reaches a substation
input buffer (token in place SS_buffer_in) it eventually causes
the arming of such a station (token in place SS_armed).
Two additional submodels are included: one is used to
update continuously the severity of the DoS attack (place
AttackSeverity and transition IncreaseSeverity), while the other
one models a timeout (Transition DisarmTimeout), after which
the armed substations are disarmed and the behavior
repeats again (possibly with a different DoS severity level).
All the transitions except DisarmTimeout fire according to
an exponential distribution. Transition DisarmTimeout is
depicted in gray to emphasize that its firing time should
be deterministic. In the experiments the deterministic has
been approximated, to limit the solution cost, as an Erlang-3,
modeled by a sequence of exponential transitions. From this
model the probability distribution of the number of armed
substations at time t, given an initial DOS severity level, can
be computed.
These distributions can be used in the SAN model in
two different ways. The first way consists of establishing
the number of available LCSs, and then computing RS2()
reconfiguration based on the estimated number k of available
LCSs. The second way consists of applying RS2() on a
predefined number of substations, but then only the actually
reachable LCSs (according to the SWN model) are used to
reconfigure the system. In the first case, RS2() reconfiguration
is computed on k LCSs, then we use prob(k,1T|L) to decide
if the reconfiguration induced by RS2() leads the EI in a
stable state. In the second case, RS2() reconfiguration is still
computed on k LCSs, but we use prob(∗,1T|L) to compute the
number of reachable LCSs at time t that will be really involved
in the reconfiguration given the initial DoS severity level L.
7. Experimental results
To discuss the impact of dependencies between II and EI in
presence of failures affecting both infrastructures, we have
performed a set of experiments using the SAN and SWN
models, for varying sets of parameters, but keeping fixed the
grid topology.
7.1. EI grid
The analyzed grid is the “IEEE One Area RTS-96” of the
IEEE Reliability Test System published in 1999 (RTS96)2 [36],
2www.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/rts/pg_tcarts.htm.
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grid. The diagram shown in Fig. 4 is an abstraction of
the topology “IEEE One Area RTS-96”, where generators are
circles, loads are squares and substations are diamonds. In
the abstraction certain transformation in the description of
the grid have been introduced. Since the SAN model does
not explicitly model buses, the following transformations
have been introduced: if there is a single load/generator
on a bus, then only the load/generator is included in the
model; if there is a load and a generator on the same bus
i, this is modeled by a separate load i, a generator i, and a
substation i, connected by dummy lines (lines for which a
failure never occurs). A postfix L and G is added to load and
generator identities i to provide a unique identifier. Another
transformation has been introduced to ease the definition
and solution of the linear programming problemwhich is part
of the proposed evaluation process: each redundant line in
the grid between any two nodes is replaced by two lines and a
dummy substation (in Fig. 4 they are labeled 125D, . . . , 128D),
and one of the lines and the substation cannot fail.
The label “Pi/P
max
i ” associated with the generators repre-
sents the initial (active) power and the maximum power that
a generator can supply. Note that in the grid we considered
all the ratios Pi/P
max
i equal to the fixed value 0.99. The label
“Di” associated with the loads represents the power demandof a load. The label “Fij/F
max
ij (bij)” associated with each line
represents the initial power flow through the line (Fij), the
maximum power flow that the line can carry (Fmaxij ) and the
susceptance (bij) used to determine the values for the power
flow through the lines. For the sake of clarity, only the inte-
ger part of the original values associated to generators, power
lines and loads are shown (in MegaWatt).
7.2. Measures of interest
The measures computed are defined in Table 1 and explained
hereafter. Since the EPS is modeled as a stochastic process,
the electrical energy provided to the final users (load ith) Pi
and the electrical energy required by the final users (demand
ith) Di are random variables. Therefore, all the measures
of interest we consider are the mean of random variables
defined as a functions of Pi and Di. The main measure of
interest we consider is UD, defined as the percentage of the
power demand that, on average, is not met in the interval
[0, t] (UD stands for “Unsatisfied Demand”). UD is a measure
of the blackout size, defined as the mean of the load shedding
during the period [0, t] (i.e., the total unsatisfied load) divided
by the total power demand in the same period. It provides
an indication of the system operator satisfaction. The measure
is computed through a transient analysis of the SAN model


































nl Number of loads
enriched through the interaction with the SWN one, as
explained in Section 6. For the computation we have used the
simulator provided by the Möbius tool [7].
To gain a better insight, three additional measures have
been defined. The measure UD can be computed “load by
load”, to provide an indication of the satisfaction of the single
users connected to that load, leading to UDi: the expected
percentage of unsatisfied load collected “by load” i. To identify
the most relevant loss, the measure PofUDi (percentage of
unsatisfied load) has been introduced: it is defined as the
expected percentage of power demand that is not met for
each load i with respect to the total undelivered load. PofUDi
can be seen as an indicator of how each load contributes to
the unsatisfied demand. Finally, nlUDgtK allows to investigate
the percentage of unsatisfied users, since it is defined as the
expected percentage of the nl loads that have experimented a
load loss greater than the k% of their demand.
All simulations reported have run with a relative accuracy
of 0.1 and a confidence level of 0.95.
7.3. Parameters and failures considered
Each experiment performed includes the definition of the
following aspects: power grid (topology, electrical parameters,
and demanded load characteristics), EI failure and repair
characteristics, II failure and repair characteristics, EI-II
interaction. We shall take them one by one. A list of acronymsand parameters, including definitions and default parameters
values, is shown in Table 2.
Grid. The reference grid introduced above has been used for
all experiments. The load demand does not change over time,
and the value of each load is indicated in Fig. 4.
EI failure and repair. At time zero, one power line is affected by
a permanent disruption (generated by an external event, such
as a tree fall or a terrorist attack), that makes it unavailable.
The repair time of the failed power lines varies from 10 to
768 h (32 days), depending on the line. The parameters of the
power grid control system have been fixed for all experiments
reported here and they include the structure of the control
(which nodes are controlled by which LCS), the time for the
local reconfiguration RS1(), which is considered negligible,
and the time for a global reconfiguration RS2(), which has
been taken equal to 10 min (this specific value has been
chosen taking into account the standard settings of power
grids, in particular of the Italian one)
Although all experiments were performed assuming
exactly one external EI failure, this does not mean that during
the interval [0, t] considered only one line can fail. Indeed this
is in general not the case, since the SANmodel includes failure
propagation, that usually results in more power line failures,
in load shedding actions, etc.
II failure and repair. The II failures considered are due to DoS
attacks to communication channels between the DSO CC
and the DSO SSs, as depicted by the SWN models. An SWN
model of a DoS attack is characterized by the duration of the
attack, the initial severity of the attack, the speed at which
the severity of the attack increases, the probability to lose a
packet and the average delay of a packet associated with each
severity level of the attack. In all experiments the duration
of the attack is exponentially distributed with mean equal to
24 h (the same expected value as for the duration of the EI
line failure), which sets our experiments in the worst case
scenario. The initial severity is instead a model parameter,
while the rate at which the severity increases has been set
to the fixed value of 8.3 × 10−3 min−1 (this value has been
computed considering that themean value of the distribution
of the random variable “DoS duration” is 24 h). The settings
of the probability of losing a packet (depending on the DoS
attack severity levels) and of the rate of transition TxDelayTable 2 – Acronym definition, parameters and their default values.
Acronyms
LCSU All LCS unreachable
LCSR All LCS reachable
FS Fixed severity
PIS Probabilistically increasing severity
TDS Time dependent severity
SAN and SWN parameters
Repair time of the failed power lines 10h, . . . ,32d
Time for reconfiguration RS_2() 10 min
Duration of the DoS attack 24 h
w(IncreaseSeverity) Rate at which the severity of the DoS attack increases 8.3 · 10−3 min−1
w(LostPacket) Probability of losing a packet for DoS level i = 1, . . . ,4 0.001, 0.1, 0.15, 0.25
w(TxDelay) Rate of transition of a packet for DoS level i = 1, . . . ,4 2 · 10−i+1
β Probability of DoS severity level transition (at each reconfiguration) 0.9
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DoS attack) for levels 1–4 are shown in Table 2 (the rate of a
transition is the inverse of its mean delay).
In all experiments, the choice of these values assures that
the DoS initial severity is the parameter with more impact
on the measure of interest (i.e. the set of LCSs on which the
reconfiguration function RS2() is computed). Obviously these
values can be updated easily on the SWN model, because
their update does not involve any change in the net structure.
EI-II interaction. As explained in Section 6, the presence
of a DoS attack may alter the set of LCSs on which the
reconfiguration function RS2() is computed, since due to
the presence of a DoS a reconfiguration command may not
reach one or more LCSs. We shall consider three cases of
interaction:
Fixed Severity (FS) i. at each time t that an RS2() reconfiguration
is computed the number of unreachable LCSs is drawn from
the distribution of the number of unreachable substations
at time t, assuming the SWN started at time 0 with a DoS
severity s.
Probabilistically Increasing Severity (PIS). at each call of RS2() the
severity level used in the SWN model can be either the same
as in the previous call (with probability β) or it is increased by
one (with probability 1− β).
Time Dependent Severity (TDS). in this case the SWN model
is started at time 0 with a given severity level (the default
is 1), and when at time t an RS2() function is applied the
distribution at time t from the SWN model is used. As
explained in Section 6 this requires a discretization of time
in steps, in order to compute with the SWN a finite number
of distributions (Note that this setting requires the use of a
tool that allows us to acquire the reached simulated time, a
feature that is possible within the SAN simulator facility of
Möbius).
7.4. Analysis of the results
In this section we discuss the results of the analysis
performed. To improve readability, only a subset of the power
lines will be shown in the figures, selected among those that,
according to the experiments, have a significant impact on
the model behavior.
Fig. 5 shows the results of a first set of experiments,
aimed at studying how different DoS situations impact on
the unsupplied load. This experiment compares the behavior
of the system for different choices of the failed line (x-axis),
upon 6 different II behaviors, from the two extreme cases of
no DoS with all LCS reachable (LCSR) and very severe DoS
with all LCS unreachable (LCSU), through four cases of Fixed
Severities (FS). Fig. 5 plots the percentage of undelivered load
for time t equal to two days (UD for t = 2d), for the different
failed power lines, identified by pairs ⟨n,n′⟩ of connected
nodes. For each line, the 6 different II behaviors are plotted,
left to right, following the top to bottom order of the legends.
Note that the impact of the DoS on the undelivered power
strongly depends upon the failed line (the EI component), and
ranges from a few percent to 20% depending on the severity
of the DoS attack (the II component). When evaluating the
reportedmeasure it is important to remember that the resultsFig. 5 – UD for different failed power lines, with fixed
severity of DoS.
Fig. 6 – UD for different failed power lines, probabilistically
increasing the DoS severity.
cover a fixed period of 48 h (2d) while the average DoS duration
and the time to repair is 24 h (1d).
Fig. 6 reports UD when t = 2d for the same failed
power lines as in the previous figure, but now the DoS
behaviors considered are the Time Dependent Severity (TDS)
and what we have called the Probabilistically Increasing
Severity case (PIS), where at each call of RS2() the DoS
is assumed to have a severity increased by 1 with a
probability β of 0.1, 0.5, 0.9, and the same severity as in the
previous call with the complementary probability. Clearly, the
greater the probability, the faster more and more LCS are
considered unreachable. As before the two extreme cases (all
reachable/all unreachable) have also been added for sake of
reference. These cases have obviously the same values for
both figures.
The two graphs of Figs. 5 and 6 consider the total load loss,
thus providing a “grid’s owner satisfaction” measure. The
graph of Fig. 7 reports instead a “user satisfaction” viewpoint,
since the load loss is computed for each load, which is an
indicator of how the supplied service meets the customer
demand during a single power line failure. The graph reports
the percentage of power demand that is not met UDi in
a period of 2 days, considering the failure of the same 6
different power lines as for the previous graphs. Observe that
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DoS severity increases very quickly (β = 0.9).
Fig. 8 – PofUDi varying the failed power line, assuming that
DoS severity increases very quickly (β = 0.9).
loads are affected quite differently, depending on the EI failed
line, and that the worst case is about 50% of lost load for
load 101L, when line (116,117) fails, which is quite a bad
performance considering that the graph is over a period twice
as long as themean time to repair of the first failed power line.
The graph in Fig. 7 assumes that the DoS is of type “PIS” with
probability β = 0.9.
Since not all loads contribute in the same way to the
total load of the system, we have investigated how each line
contributes to the total undelivered load. Fig. 8 reports PofUDi,
the percentage of power demand that is not met for each
load i with respect to total undelivered load. The setting is
the same as for Fig. 7. Due to its definition, the sum over all
loads of the bars of a given failed line sum up to 1. Again,
there is a high variability: observe the load 110 in Fig. 8 and
in Fig. 7. Upon failure of line (114,116), represented by the
black bar, Fig. 7 reports that this failure provokes almost
30% shedding of load 110, and that a failure in line (114,116)
is the worst failure for load 110. On the other side, when
taking into account the contribution that load 110 gives to
the entire load, it is clear from the graph in Fig. 8 that the
most severe case is a failure in line (107,108). In fact, when
such a failure occurs, due to the topology of the grid and
related electric parameters, the contribution of load 110 toFig. 9 – UDi varying the failed power line, assuming that
DoS is of type TDS.
Fig. 10 – PofUDi varying the failed power line, assuming
that DoS is of type TDS.
the total undelivered load amounts to almost 80%, while the
contribution from the other loads is very low.
Figs. 9 and 10 report the same indices and the same setting
of Figs. 7 and 8, but now the DoS behavior considered is what
we have called the Time Dependent Severity (TDS). Note that
a significant difference can be observed with respect to Figs. 7
and 8, since the highest percentage of lost load is now due to
load 106, for a failure of line (107,108).
Figs. 11 and 12 take instead a different viewpoint,
concentrating on a single load. Fig. 11 observes the percentage
of undelivered load for a single load (load 101L in the figure)
showing its variation as a function of the failed line and of
the DoS behavior model, considering again the two extreme
cases of all LCS reachable (LCSR case) and unreachable
(LCSU), four values for fixed severity (1–4), the three cases
of probabilistically increasing severity and the case of time
dependent increasing severity.
Fig. 12 plots the contribution of load 101L to the total power
loss (PofUD101L) for the various DoS behaviors considered
in the interactions. Again the high variability support the
conjecture that a detailedmodeling of the EI and II interaction
is needed to have realistic results.
The last two figures provide another “system operator
satisfaction” viewpoint, as it looks into the number of
unsatisfied users, where each load is considered a single user
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different failed power lines.
Fig. 12 – PofUD101L as a function of the DoS behavior for
different failed power lines.
and a user is tagged as unsatisfied if the percentage of its own
unsatisfied demand is above k% of its total request during the
observed period (again from 0 to 2d). They do not plot the
total number of users, but the percentage of unsatisfied users
(loads) over the total number of users (loads), the nlUDgtK
defined before (see Table 1).
In Fig. 13, it can be observed that, in the case of the
failed line (103,124), about 80% of the users has experienced
a reduction of supply with respect to its required load (case
k = 0), and that about 10% has experienced a loss of more
than 90% (case k = 90). This is the worst case for users
unsatisfied to lose any percentage of requested demand. The
failure with less impact on the percentage of unsatisfied users
is that of line (107,108), which leads to more than 30% of
the users with some unsatisfied demand, but only a few
percentage (less than 5%) with a loss greater than 10.
Fig. 14 concentrates instead on a single failed line. Fig. 14
plots the percentage of unsatisfied users nlUDgtK for four
different values of k, comparing the effect of the different
DoS evolution types, upon failure of line (103,124). From the
plot it is evident that a very high number of users is affected
by the failure (from a minimum of 75% to a maximum of
95%) depending on how many LCS are reachable, and that
depending of the type of DoS this loss can be limited or rather
severe (compare the two extremes LCSU and LCSR for the case
of at least 50% or 90% of users affected).Fig. 13 – nlUDgtK, the percentage of loads whose
unsatisfied demand is greater than k%, varying the failed
power line and increasing the DoS severity very quickly
(PIS, β = 0.9).
Fig. 14 – nlUDgtK as a function of the DoS behavior for
different values of k and power line (103,124).
In summary, the plots show that, for the IEEE test grid,
the effects on the users (loads) of a power failure can differ
significantly depending on the starting severity of the DoS
and on the speed at which the DoS propagates increasing
its severity. A model taking into account only the electrical
aspects will therefore fail to provide the system operator with
an adequate picture of the impact of power failures.
8. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have shown two different approaches to the
modeling and quantification of the interplay between EI and II
failures in a EPS. The two models have been instantiated on a
specific scenario of cyberattack to the EPS: a DoS attack during
a control teleoperation in which DSO and TSO cooperate in a
load shedding activity.
Each approach focuses on a specific aspect and in this
paper we have investigated how they can be synergistically
integrated. The interaction is based on a computation, on
the SWN model, of a set of distributions that are then used
by the SAN model to characterize the DoS attack impact.
We performed a large set of evaluations of the EPS behavior,
that have addressed the quantification of the impact of
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satisfaction of both users and system operators, e.g. the
percentage of mean power demand that is not met in
the interval [0, t]. Specifically, five different DoS attacks are
analyzed, in conjunction with the failure of power lines
of the “IEEE One Area RTS-96” test grid. The performed
variety of analysis showed that the effects on the user
satisfaction of a power line failure can differ significantly
depending on the starting severity of the DoS and on the
speed at which its severity increases. The results, although
limited to the specific scenario and settings considered, point
out the usefulness of such a study in understanding the
dynamics of the involved failure phenomena, useful to take
appropriate countermeasures to limit their effects on the user
satisfaction.
In the presentedwork the SAN and SWNmodels have been
kept separate. An alternative approach could be to extend
the SAN model to embed into the SAN itself a submodel
equivalent, or similar, to the SWN one.We see some drawback
in this alternative: the simulation time will increase and
the efficient SWN specific solution methods [5] could not be
applied. Moreover, a modular approach should make it easier
to experiment with different types of attacks, as far as they
result in lost or delayed communications.
A positive side-effect of having precisely defined the
interaction schema between the twomodels has been to point
out the significant parameters of DoS attack state affecting
the EI reconfiguration process after a failure.
Directions for future work include extensions of the inte-
grated SWN-SAN analysis to consider other critical EPS sce-
narios where cyber attacks are involved inmore sophisticated
failures of the electric infrastructures, such as simultaneous
failure of more power lines.
A further interesting research direction is represented by
the integration of the results from cyber attack experiments,
such as those presented in [37], to refine and validate the Petri
net modeling the attack process and evaluate its impact.
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